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THESIS

**DEVIANT GLOBALIZATION AND THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF COCA
ERADICATION IN COLOMBIA**

by

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June 2012

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CONSEQUENCES OF COCA ERADICATION IN COLOMBIA**

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ABSTRACT

By the late 1980s, Colombia had become the world's leading producer and exporter of cocaine, as well as the most important coca growing country in the Andes. In the context of the War on Drugs, U.S. aid to the country increased significantly during this period, and by 1991, Colombia was the leading recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America. Despite the increase in U.S. resources, Colombia's military suffered a series of important defeats to prominent guerilla groups, which were regarded as major players in the cocaine trade, as well as a serious threat to political stability in the country. In response, a U.S. and Colombian partnership known as Plan Colombia (2000–2005) was initiated, and in accordance with the plan, more coca was eradicated in Colombia than anywhere else in the world. In this context, this thesis asks, what are the unintended consequences of coca eradication as they pertain to Plan Colombia? To answer this question, this thesis elucidates the fundamental linkages between “mainstream” and “deviant” globalization and the unintended consequences of supply-side drug control efforts, such as an eradication policy. It also illuminates how the most important global economic transformations of the past 40 years have profoundly and continuously undermined U.S. efforts to eradicate coca, and how strategies that continue to discount the role of globalization (deviant or otherwise) will likely play out in the future.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACI	Andean Counterdrug Initiative
AUC	United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
CNAIP	Comprehensive Assistance to the Population Displaced by Violence
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organizations
ELN	National Liberation Army
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (<i>las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas</i>)
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IPS	Institute for Policy Studies
OAS	Organization of American States
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
UNGASS	United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly
UNODC	United Nation Office on Drug Control
WOLA	Washington Office on Latin America

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

By the late 1980s, Colombia had assumed the mantle of the world's leading producer and exporter of cocaine. At the same time, it had also become the most important coca growing country in the Andes. In the context of the War on Drugs, U.S. aid to the country increased significantly during this period, and by 1991, Colombia was the leading recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America.¹ Despite the increase in U.S. resources, Colombia's military suffered a series of important defeats to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas*—FARC), which was regarded as a major player in the cocaine trade, as well as a serious threat to political stability in the country. Consequently, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998–2002) pledged to control the drug trade and end the conflict with the FARC, and therefore, Plan Colombia was born. The U.S. and Colombian partnership known as Plan Colombia was designed as a six-year initiative with three main objectives: (1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security; (2) promote social and economic justice; and (3) promote the rule of law.² The idea for Plan Colombia originated in Colombia, and was initially viewed as a welcome step by U.S. policy makers who indicated that Colombia was taking ownership of its development and security challenges. As originally proposed by President Pastrana, it covered five principle areas: the peace process; economic growth; anti-drug production and trafficking; the reform of the justice system, and the protection of human rights; as well as democracy-promotion and social development.

¹ María Clemencia Ramírez Lemus, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh, "Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War," in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 105.

² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance* (GAO-09-71), Washington, DC: GPO, October 2008, 11.

After Pastrana's first visit to Washington, however, his viewpoint changed significantly. Washington's response was that Plan Colombia was but a "catalog of good intentions" that needed considerable editing.³ Accordingly, with U.S. aid tied to the revisions it wanted to impose, Pastrana reconsidered his approach and decided that a U.S.-backed militarized strategy was required to resolve Colombia's security and development issues. Following that decision, most of the aid for Colombia was redirected towards interdiction and eradication efforts at the expense of other stated goals, including much needed development. This redirection in strategy ensured that more coca eradication would be conducted in Colombia than anywhere else in the world. The strategy however, was executed in an environment of weak institutional development and limited state presence outside of urban centers, thereby widening the "legitimacy" gap between the state and the populace. All the while, globalization was connecting the world's economies (both licit and illicit), and contributing to the complexity of global networks.

The concept of unintended consequences is useful for examining coca eradication policies because it illuminates the perverse unanticipated effects of legislation relating to coca eradication and the War on Drugs. As the 19th century French economic journalist Frédéric Bastiat observed, the "seen" were the obvious visible consequences of an action or policy, but the "unseen" were less obvious, and often unintended, consequences. In his famous essay entitled "What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen," Bastiat wrote:

In the economic sphere, an act, a habit, institution, a law produces not only one effect, but a series of effects. Of these effects, the first alone is immediate, it appears simultaneously with the cause; it is seen. The other effects emerge subsequently; they are not seen; we are fortunate if we foresee them. There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen. Yet this difference is tremendous; for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favorable, the later consequences are disastrous, and vice versa. Whence it

³ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*, 11.

follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good that will be followed by a great evil to come, while the good economist pursues a great good to come, at the risk of a small present evil.⁴

Bastiat's discussion on the "seen" and the "unseen" is particularly useful for this thesis considering the connection he draws between societal costs and bad public policy not rooted in sound economics. As is discussed, coca eradication specifically, and the War on Drugs more generally, is one such example in which the policy of choice misjudged in a large way the socioeconomic realities of Colombia, and underestimated the countervailing effects of the changing world economy. Robert Jervis noted that the most obvious reason for unintended consequences is competition. "As actors seek advantage and try to outstrategize one another, come of them –if not all–must be surprised."⁵ Competition between state and non-state actors in the context of a rapidly globalizing world is the focus of this thesis: What are the unintended consequences of the coca eradication as they pertain to Plan Colombia?

To answer this question, this thesis elucidates the fundamental linkages between mainstream and deviant globalization (these terms are clarified in more detail below), the unintended consequences of coca eradication, and the artificially elevated risk premium that result from supply-side drug control policies, such as coca eradication. It also illuminates how the most important global economic transformations of the past 40 years have profoundly and continuously undermined U.S. efforts to eradicate coca, and how strategies that continue to discount globalization (deviant or otherwise) and its contribution to a more interactively complex world, will likely play out in the future. Specifically, globalization and the infrastructure that supports it have helped shift existing political structures, especially in the developing world, and today's deviant entrepreneurs have accrued the power and influence equivalent to, or in excess of the state. Pablo

⁴ For more information relating to the history, use, and formalization of the term "unintended consequences," refer to Rob Norton, "Unintended Consequences, in the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics," 2008, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html>; Frédéric Bastiat's essay, "What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen," 2000, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html>; Robert K. Merton, *Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

⁵ Jervis, Robert. *Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton, N.J.: (Princeton University Press, 2005), 61.

Escobar, for example, worked his way to the top of Colombia's Medellin Cartel, and became one of the world's wealthiest men by engaging in illicit activities. Escobar was inaugurated on *Forbes* Billionaires issue in 1987, where he remained for seven consecutive years until his death, appearing for the final time in the July 1993 Billionaires issue.⁶ His cocaine business enabled him to use some of his ill-gotten funds to "develop" Medellin. He built houses for the poor, soccer fields, and a zoo for the public. He would also go on to buy a Medellin newspaper, become influential in politics, and even run for public office. This example demonstrates how profits from illicit businesses are used to garner popular support, and how deviant entrepreneurs can establish themselves atop of a complex globally integrated system through which they develop enough capacity to compete directly with the state for power and influence.

B. IMPORTANCE

For more than four decades, the United States (U.S.) has been involved in the War on Drugs, and throughout much of this period, the eradication of coca crops across the Andes has been a major component of Washington's drug control policy. The principle targets of U.S. eradication campaigns since the beginning of the War on Drugs in the early 1970s have been Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Eradication policy is driven by the premise that eliminating coca plants will lead to a decrease in the production of cocaine, and gradually over time, supply will diminish in the United States. As cocaine becomes scarce, prices are expected to increase, and thereby, further discouraging its use. However, illicit drug markets have proven impossible to control, particularly from the supply-side. Despite temporarily successful eradication programs in Peru and Bolivia in the late-1990s, coca cultivation moved north to Colombia, which ensured that it remained the most important cocaine producing country in the world.⁷ This example illustrates a recurring phenomenon known as the "balloon effect," a term that is used widely in the

⁶ Pablo Escobar is not unique as a billionaire drug lord. In her article, Erin Carlyle, "Billionaire Druglords: El Chapo Guzman, Pablo Escobar, The Ochoa Brothers," *Forbes*, March 12, 2012, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/03/13/billionaire-druglords-el-chapo-guzman-pablo-escobar-the-ochoa-brothers/>, she discusses the top money earners of the illicit narcotics industry.

⁷ Jeremy Bigwood and Phillip Coffin, "Coca Eradication," *FPIF*, October 2005, http://www.fpif.org/reports/coca_eradication.

literature to describe how the various elements of the narcotics industry shift production and trafficking patterns in response to pressure from government counternarcotic initiatives, analogous to the movement of air inside of a squeezed balloon. However, this analogy does not even begin to capture the full extent of the negative socioeconomic and environmental consequences each time the illicit industry uproots to a new location.

The research found numerous examples of unintended consequences that resulted from coca eradication. One obvious example is the ongoing internal migration and/or internal displacement throughout the Colombian countryside in response to coca eradication. Every time the government manually or aurally destroys a coca crop in one area, coca growers move elsewhere to both escape from the harmful effects of fumigation and to resume growing coca.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis examines the unintended consequences of coca eradication from a different, yet significant angle related to an often neglected element in global power dynamics (mainstream and deviant globalization). It needs to be elucidated that transnational organized crime networks, such as those involved in the illegal drug trade, are amongst the main beneficiaries of the wave of globalization today and have been since the 1970s. As a result, they have acquired a tremendous amount of power in the developing world. This process has only increased with the end of the Cold War.

A growing enthusiasm for neo-liberal economic reform had already emerged by the early 1980s, and was given a dramatic boost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, neo-liberalism was clearly in the ascendant as the leading paradigm for development strategists looking to deliver globalization to those parts of the world that had not yet been able to benefit from its virtues. Francis Fukuyama's influential work, *The End of History*, which appeared as an article in 1989 and a book in 1992 served for many observers to help define a process of global transformation. Fukuyama (who did not actually use the term "globalization") argued that the end of the Cold War was part of an evolutionary political process that had convincingly demonstrated that liberal democracy (grounded in liberal capitalism) had become the dominant form of human

government in the post-Cold War era with no serious and/or systemic competitors: “from monarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and communist dictatorships” of the 20th century, “the only form of government that has survived intact” with the passing of state-socialism and communist dictatorships “has been liberal democracy.”⁸ Amongst the things Fukuyama did not foresee, however, were the countervailing effects of the rapid and highly uneven spread of globalization, the implications of which (as is illuminated later) are central to putting coca eradication in context and gaining a fuller appreciation of its unintended consequences. As noted by Thomas Friedman in the *World is Flat*, the world has arrived at the next phase of “globalization” (Globalization 3.0) in which the convergence of factors, such as post-Cold War economic liberalization, technological advances, and integrated global supply chains, have gone from empowering governments, then companies, and ultimately, individuals.⁹

Advancing neo-liberal reform and the spread of globalization, for example, had profound implications for the already weak “state capacity” in the nation-states of the former Soviet Bloc and throughout the Third World (what has also increasingly become known as the Global South), which had major implications for what was the Colombian vision of, and what would ultimately become the U.S. vision and prosecution of Plan Colombia. Of particular significance in this thesis is the way in which neo-liberal economic reforms facilitated the “hollowing out” of a growing number of states around the world, as funding for state budgets was drastically scaled back, public sector companies and services were privatized, while reform in the areas of labor, taxation and foreign investment were pursued with enthusiasm in an attempt to compete in an increasingly liberal world economy.¹⁰ As a result, a lack of governance and state capacity, which in many cases was already problematic, became worse. The power vacuum was quickly filled by illicit actors, such as warlords and transnational organized

⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). 45.

⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 10–12.

¹⁰ Comments from Nils Gilman from a talk he gave. Nils Gilman, “Deviant Globalization,” The Long Now Foundation, *FORAtv*, (n.d.), http://fora.tv/2010/05/10/Nils_Gilman_Deviant_Globalization.

crime, many of which now operate on a scope and scale that far exceeds the capacity of states in many parts of the developing world and puts them in a position comparable to large, legitimate transnational corporations in terms of influence.

While the “hollowing out of the state” and the growing power of both legal and illegal businesses are central to shedding new light on the unintended consequences of coca eradication, it remains useful for the purposes of this thesis to also review Plan Colombia from multiple scales and/or levels analysis. First is the standard empirical evaluation of key metrics to determine the results of the policy of eradication; second is the “U.S. perspective,” and finally, the “Colombian perspective.” It is important to examine these varying viewpoints because even though the same two governments might execute the same policy and achieve the same results, the policy can be considered a success or failure depending on the government concerned. For example, eradication efforts in Colombia might be considered a success as measured in total hectares eradicated, a reduction in total cocaine produced, and/or reduced coca cultivation. However, the U.S. perspective might consider success in terms of slowing down illicit cocaine flows across its border. This thesis focuses the analysis on the ripple effects of coca eradication policy at the Colombian and the U.S. scale. It is probable, however, that other scales can be found. Regionally, for example, eradication has contributed to shifting coca-growing patterns between Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, and fluid trafficking networks linked to Mexico, and more recently, Brazil. Each government is myopic, and therefore, is going to draw different conclusions about the success or failure of anti-narcotics strategies. This thesis is arguing that these perspectives are insufficient to understand fully the array of unintended consequences of coca eradication and introduces the lens of globalization to help better understand them.

A substantial amount of resources was committed to Plan Colombia, and a considerable portion was allocated for coca eradication. Therefore, an expected outcome should have been a significant reduction in the supply of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, along with a decrease of cocaine use in the United States. The objective of Plan Colombia specific to coca eradication was to reduce production by 50 percent over a period of six years. According to the United Nation Office on Drug

Control (UNODC), however, the reductions over the six-year period were marginal despite an extensive aerial eradication campaign. Additionally, the global supply of cocaine during the same time period increased and the price remained relatively stable.¹¹

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature regarding the War and Drugs, Plan Colombia and coca eradication is vast. It can be roughly divided into three general points of view: first, the effects of eradication have met or contributed to most of the stated objectives; second, the effects of eradication have failed to meet or contribute to most of the state objectives; and third, the results are mixed.

The most favorable narratives regarding Plan Colombia came from official channels, principally the agencies charged with administering Plan Colombia such as the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), and Presidential administrations. According to the State Department for example, the success of Plan Colombia is real and measurable and has helped Colombia fight narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and transnational crime; promote economic and social development; assist conflict victims; strengthen democratic institutions, including human rights mechanisms and the justice system; and begin a process to demobilize and reintegrate illegal armed groups.¹² The Colombian official position on Plan Colombia is equally optimistic. Since 2002, Colombia has experienced an unprecedented period of economic expansion, social development, and increased security. Through a series of bold reforms, the government has fostered growth of the Colombian economy, increased government transparency, investment in social welfare programs and experienced a significant reduction of the level of violence in the country. The administration of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002–2010) attributed Plan Colombia to a policy based on a platform of *Restoring Confidence*. He reported that since 2000, U.S. assistance has enabled the Colombians to achieve

¹¹ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Fact Sheet—Colombia Coca Survey For 2004,” in *Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region, A Survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru*, June 2005, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Part1_executive_summary.pdf.

¹² Excerpt from Department of State briefing. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “Future Engagement and Partnership With Latin America,” as Prepared for Delivery at the Council of the America (Washington, DC, November 20, 2006).

significant security advances in two key areas. The first is an enhanced police and military presence throughout the country that has displaced illegal armed groups, and second, they have degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened their operational capabilities through advanced counter-narcotics strategy, and military and police actions.¹³

The preponderance of the independent literature relating to Plan Colombia and the policy of eradication is negative. Coletta Youngers offers one of the seminal works on the topic in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*.¹⁴ The work reviews the regional implication of U.S. drug policy, and specifically addresses the rise of Plan Colombia, the shift in focus from development, and the adverse effects of eradication. For example, Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh describe the partial shift away from interdiction and the renewed emphasis with which the United States and Colombia pursued crop eradication. The reasoning observed was that interdiction was expensive and complicated, and required the deployment of forces, overseas bases, operations in international waters, close cooperation with host nation security forces, and a litany of other complexities. On the other hand, eradication was perceived as simple because crops are out in the open and “they don’t move,” and under President Clinton’s directive, eradication became the preferred approach to drug control in the 1990s.¹⁵ Paul Gootenberg has written one of the most comprehensive works covering the history of the cocaine industry from 1850 to the present.¹⁶ His biggest contribution is his methodical tracing of the events and policies that helped give rise to cocaine as a global drug. Grace Livingstone offers another historical perspective. Her work centers on the relationship between the rise of the drug industry in Colombia on the one hand and the country’s longstanding social inequalities

¹³ Embassy of Colombia, “Colombia: A Success Story, Restoring Confidence,” (n.d.), <http://www.colombiaemb.org/spanish/colombia-a-success-story-mainmenu-94/restoring-confidence-mainmenu-230>.

¹⁴ Youngers, Coletta A., and Eileen Rosin. “The US War on Drugs: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy*, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin. 3. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

¹⁵ Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” 117.

¹⁶ Paul Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: the Making of a Global Drug* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).

and political exclusion on the other hand.¹⁷ Michael Kenney, meanwhile, provides great insight into the organization and structure of the cartel's, and how they leverage the network structure to adapt and innovate ahead of law enforcement institutions.¹⁸ Additional relevant and timely online sources include Adam Isacson's Drug Policy desk at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)¹⁹ and Sanho Tree of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)²⁰. Together, they represent the front that studies alternative policy options and political movements within the United States, the United Nations (UN) and elsewhere, which may have a broader impact on the emerging drug legislation and drug policies overall.

Most of the mixed results are found in the literature produced by think tanks and in bi-partisan surveys and reports submitted to the U.S. Congress for review. For example, a RAND Corporation study projected that the savings of treatment programs are larger than the control costs. They estimated that the costs of crime and lost productivity are reduced by \$7.46 for every dollar spent on treatment.²¹ The Government Accounting Office is another example of mixed reporting. For example, their reports typically have a positive outlook on the professional character of military and police training, but temper the achievement with a warning about human rights violations.

Given the perspective on transnational organized crime and its relationship to the failure of coca eradication as presented in this thesis, it is also important to discuss the relevant literature on globalization. The main concern is to discuss some key examples of

¹⁷ Grace Livingstone, *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004).

¹⁸ Michael Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University State Press, 2007).

¹⁹ Adam Isacson is a key member of WOLA's Regional Security Policy team and his areas of expertise include: Regional and Military Security Policy, Arms Transfers, and U.S. Assistance. For more information on his work and WOLA, visit: http://www.wola.org/people/adam_isacson

²⁰ Sanho Tree is a fellow and director of the Drug Policy Project at the institute of Policy Studies. The focus of his work is to end the domestic and international "War on Drugs" and replace it with policies that promote public health and safety, as well as economic alternatives to the prohibition drug economy. For more information on his work, visit: <http://www.ips-dc.org/staff/sanho>

²¹ Rydell, C.P. & Everingham, S.S., *Controlling Cocaine*, Prepared for the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the United States Army (Santa Monica, CA: Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corporation, 1994), p. xvi.

the globalization literature that reflect the extremes ends of the spectrum of the ongoing debate about the positive and negative consequences of globalization. The work of Thomas Friedman and Nils Gilman helps to establish the extreme position at either end of the debate. Friedman provides the context for the upside of globalization, whereas Gilman is a bit more representative of the “ugly underbelly” of globalization, or as he terms it, “deviant globalization.” Friedman’s best-selling book, *The World Is Flat*, was a celebration of globalization and the benefits that flowed from U.S. political and economic leadership in the post-Cold War world. The essence of his globalization argument is that the world is becoming a level playing field and more and more people have an opportunity to participate in the global economy, where “flatteners,” such as technology, connectivity and collaboration, have leveled the global playing field, unlike any other time in history.²² However, globalization is not making the world flatter or more equal for everyone. Gilman continues the story of globalization where Friedman left off by exposing the shadowy reality of globalization as experienced in much of the developing world. He describes deviant globalization as a different category of economic actions that violate noneconomic, “Western” norms expressed in terms of human rights, modalities of violence and health, and even notions of the sacred.²³ For illicit actors who perpetuate deviant globalization, there is nothing deviant about it. In today’s era of globalization in which large portions of the developing world are excluded (in part because of ineffective state institutions made worse the process already characterized as the “hollowing out of the state”), deviant entrepreneurs from the global south served as the arbiters for prosperity and development with resources several orders of magnitude greater than the aid provided by the state. In fact, the unconstrained illicit forms of liberal capitalism are far more central to globalization (if not at the center of globalization) than most observers realize, or terms, such as “deviant globalization,” might suggest. For the purposes of this thesis, Friedman helps establish the technological and institutional advances that have helped to connect the world. Gilman provides the background for understanding how

²² Friedman, Thomas L. *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

²³ Gilman, Nils, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, ed. *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century*. London: Continuum, 2011, 9.

deviant entrepreneurs exploit these connections towards their ends. In Colombia, newly connected and highly fluid networks of deviant entrepreneurs empowered by the networks of a globalized world were able to adapt to, and in a large measure, defeat the more structured counter-narcotic programs sponsored by the state. During this contest between deviant entrepreneurs and the state however, amongst the biggest losers have been the rural populations of Colombia, who at the conclusion of Plan Colombia, have suffered a number of severe and long-lasting unintended consequences.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis provides a broad qualitative analysis of the War on Drugs, Plan Colombia, and a focus on coca eradication, one of the prominent strategies within it. In particular, it examines how mainstream and deviant globalization contributed to the failure of the coca eradication policy and the unintended consequences thereof.

Several issues arise out of any critical discussion of coca eradication. To begin with, sufficient evidence suggests supply-side controls, such as eradication, are ineffective at reducing cocaine supply. For example, U.S. initiated efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to reduce marijuana trafficking from Mexico resulted in an increase in domestic production, and the growth of a marijuana industry in Colombia.²⁴ The question arises as to why eradication was pursued as a policy if outcomes could have been known? A second issue that emerges from an examination of the data on eradication is the adverse regional implications that have been created or reinforced because of Plan Colombia. Even with declines in coca growing as a result of eradication in 2002 and 2003 for example, the short-term success was not translated to strategic success; namely, deep and sustainable reductions in the cultivation of coca overall and the availability of cocaine on U.S. streets.²⁵ Reductions in Colombia's estimated cocaine production have been largely offset by a return of cocaine production to Peru and Bolivia, the original

²⁴ Steven Hyland, Jr., "The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drugs Trafficking, Origins," *Ohio State University, OSU Department of History* 4, no. 12 (2012).

²⁵ Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, "Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War," 113.

production and coca growing hubs prior to Colombia's ascendancy as the major production center for cocaine as opposed to coca growing.²⁶

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS

After 40 years of prosecuting the War on Drugs, the quality and quantity of cocaine that reach the U.S. market has continued to increase. In part, this increase can be attributed to the unrelenting emphasis by every U.S. administration since Richard M. Nixon (1968–1974) on interdiction and eradication. However, as this thesis argues, the story is far more complicated. Regardless of whether interdiction and eradication are viewed as working, not working, or the best of available policy options, it is emphasized that eradication had, and is continuing to have, a range of major unintended consequences that flow from, and are linked to, the uneven spread of globalization. Ultimately, globalization helps better understand the failure to win the War on Drugs, while also providing greater insight into the unintended consequences of Plan Colombia in general and coca eradication in particular.

While Chapter I has sought to introduce the topic and outline the argument, Chapter II contextualizes coca eradication as a phenomenon highly dependent on the dynamics of deviant and mainstream globalization. Chapter III turns to the equally important need to lay out the counter-narcotic patterns that began with the War on Drugs in the Andes, and then provides a more detailed analysis of Plan Colombia and coca eradication from the different levels of analysis. The fourth chapter examines in detail the unintended consequences of coca eradication, which is followed by a short conclusion. Overall, it is assumed that a better understanding of the unintended consequences of coca eradication requires a detailed grasp of mainstream and deviant globalization. It is to a more detailed discussion of globalization in both its mainstream and deviant forms that Chapter II addresses.

²⁶ Gabriel Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives," *Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, University of Miami and the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute*, (2001): 32.

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II. THE NORMALCY OF “DEVIANT GLOBALIZATION AND THE DEVIANCE OF MAINSTREAM GLOBALIZATION

If you like entrepreneurship, if you like innovation, then you have to like deviant globalization! Deviant Globalization is development, representing an extremely significant flow of money and resources from the global north to the global south...almost certainly several orders of magnitude bigger than the foreign aid ... and an order of magnitude greater than remittances.²⁷

-Nils Gilman

A central argument of this thesis is that the dynamic unfolding of mainstream and deviant globalization is crucial to understanding the U.S.-led War on Drugs, and Plan Colombia, generally, and the unintended consequences of coca eradication more specifically. The origins of globalization (mainstream and deviant) as the term is being applied in this thesis can be traced to the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the growing consolidation of globalization corresponded with a revival of the Cold War, while the end of the Cold War meant that by the 1990s, globalization was being increasingly accepted and even embraced worldwide. The overall process of globalization, however, continues to be uneven and unfinished. As such, it needs to be emphasized that the benefits of globalization have been concentrated in the hands of some people much more than others, and in some parts of the world, much more than others,²⁸ which is the case whether discussing legitimate transnational corporations or transnational organized crime syndicates. Meanwhile, the unintended consequences have also been concentrated and have been felt far more by some people than others. In an earlier period, it was generally accepted that nation-states in theory and/or in practice were more focused on domestic development in an international context. With the rise and spread of mainstream and deviant globalization, most states have embraced a new role: that of facilitating globalization for the state. This divergence, especially in the developing world, is central

²⁷ This quote is a reference taken from Nils Gilman's work on modernization theory and deviant globalization. Review his talk on deviant globalization at FORA.tv. For more background see, Gilman, "Deviant Globalization."

²⁸ Ibid.

to understanding the failure of supply-side approaches to controlling the trade in illegal drugs. As seen in the case of Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, globalization has reinforced uneven economic development and “the hollowing out of the state.”²⁹ This chapter examines mainstream and deviant globalization to help provide a framework to understand better the unintended consequences of coca eradication in relation to Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs.

A. FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND DEVIANT GLOBALIZATION

The origins of globalization can be found in the changes in international finance in the 1970s initiated by the administration of U.S. president Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974). In 1971, for example, he floated the U.S. dollar and suspended its convertibility to gold, and implemented other changes driven by immediate economic and geopolitical concerns.³⁰ When combined with the major increase in oil prices in late 1973, they had at least four important symptoms that set the stage for the subsequent consolidation of mainstream and deviant globalization. First, in the Nixon era, private banks and financial institutions (particularly U.S.-based) took on a far more important role in the global economy. Second, government supervision of global financial activity was seriously weakened, which made money laundering much easier (more on this later). Third, financial systems and exchange rates of states around the world were more susceptible to changes in US financial markets, particularly those countries in Latin America. Fourth, greater competition in national banking systems worldwide was encouraged, while the United States assumed a position that allowed it to influence the regulatory regime governing financial markets around the world.³¹ Fundamental technological advances,

²⁹ This quote is a reference taken from Nils Gilman’s work on modernization theory and deviant globalization. Review his talk on deviant globalization at FORA.tv. For more background see, Gilman, “Deviant Globalization.”

³⁰ Robert Brenner, “Uneven Development and the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 1950–1998,” *New Left Review* I, no. 229 (1998): 43, 47, 116–24.

³¹ Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance* (London: Verso, 1999), 4–5, 19–26.

especially in the area of information technology, aided these financial changes.³² As the Cold War ended, these technological affordances were at the core of the arrival of this latest wave of globalization. The supply chains of these principle world economic hubs became much more integrated and dramatic advances in communication-improved factors, such as in-transit visibility replaced stockpile inventory with just-in-time inventories that increased the reliability and delivery of goods and information across the globe and increasingly bound the major financial centers in North America, Western Europe and East Asia, together.

At the same time, these financial and technological shifts in the world economy also established the conditions for a scaling-up of ‘deviant globalization’ by connecting those parts of the world on the periphery of globalization to those at its core. The term “deviant globalization” is taken from Nils Gilman’s recent edited book, *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century*. It refers to the cross-border economic networks that operate “at the intersection of ethical difference and regulatory inefficiency.” As they emphasize, “wherever there is a fundamental disagreement about what is right” combined with “a connection to the global market” we can be sure that “deviant entrepreneurs” will be “there to meet the unfulfilled demand.”³³ The concept of “deviant globalization” has major implications for the debate about globalization generally, but it is also particularly useful for the subject of this thesis. It sheds new light on, and helps more effectively frame the cross-border economic networks that demand, produce, move, and consume illegal or objectionable goods in the formal global economy. Among the wide range of goods and services that thrive in the shadows of the legal global economy, illicit narcotics trafficking is amongst the most profitable, and its rapid growth and consolidation in some areas of the world has become a major challenge to existing structures of governance, wealth, and development. Simply put, deviant globalization is inextricably intertwined with mainstream globalization, far more than the term ‘deviant’ actually implies; both of which are market-driven activities enabled by the

³² Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000): 559.

³³ Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, ed., *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century* (London: Continuum, 2011).

same globally integrated financial, communication, and transportation systems. “Both break down boundaries—political, economic, cultural, social, and environmental—in a dynamic process of creative destruction.”³⁴ Deviant globalization is an unintended consequence of globalization and it is not secondary to it; it is central to it.

The infrastructure of the global economy is unconcerned with social values or moral disparities between countries. The trade in illegal narcotics and sex slaves for example moves across borders just as readily as automobiles and coffee. Coca eradication forced coca cultivation, cocaine production and trafficking to move as well, and as the industry grew, it realigned itself as part of a division of labor in which most Latin American and Caribbean nations played some role in the production and trafficking value chain of cocaine. “As these systems became increasingly efficient, interconnected and indispensable, they helped not only the formal global economy to grow, but also its conjoined, deviant twin,” shifting the balance of power between non-state actors and the state in the process.³⁵ As discussed in more detail in Chapter IV, the market opportunities that created deviant globalization were precisely those policies guided by the ethical differences between countries. Another of Gilman and his co-editor’s important contributions to the vast literature on globalization is their explanation of how it affects both the rich (Global North) and the poor (Global South). Perhaps because the Global North has understood deviant globalization primarily as a means to meet individual demands for things, such as sex and drugs, it has been thought of as a sideline activity operating only on the periphery. However, the Global South has a very different relationship with deviant globalization. For them, it is a powerful engine of wealth creation and a symbol of their exclusion and abjection. On the one hand, participating in deviant globalization is often an individual’s fastest ticket out of poverty, and a way for entire communities to experience economic development. On the other hand, deviant globalization often entails harrowing individual suffering, but it can also provide money

³⁴ Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber, ed., *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century*, 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

and power to self-dealing government officials, brutal warlords, terrorists, and transnational organized crime.³⁶

The final and most relevant insight afforded by deviant globalization is the explanation of how it has altered the political landscape and distribution of power in the world economy in ways nearly as profound as any major political-economic trend or event has done since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that until recently, the international community has largely neglected to appreciate the impact deviant globalization has had on international politics and the economy, and when the world's leadership meets to discuss important issues, such as the global financial crisis, global climate change, and poverty for example, deviant globalization is absent from the dialogue. However, deviant globalization is inextricably connected to these important global issues, and also needs to be highlighted and discussed. As an example of the connection between deviant globalization and global climate change, consider the unintended deforestation that is a consequence of the wholesale and forced aerial eradication of coca plants in Colombia. One of the major contributors to deforestation in Colombia and the Andes is the "balloon effect" relating to the relocation of coca cultivation. As crops are eradicated in one area, the *cocaleros* (coca growers), reacting to the unrelenting demand from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, move their coca growing operations deeper and deeper into the jungle to grow thousands of additional hectares of coca, which is the main component in the making of cocaine. When government authorities discover these new coca plots, the entire process repeats itself all over again. Many of the social and economic impacts of illicit drug production have been studied in great detail but deforestation and environmental degradation is an unintended consequence that has received limited attention.

Most portrayals of globalization concentrate on how information technology, financial networks, and logistics have come together to reshape the global economic order. However, another important and often overlooked component (deviant globalization) has also introduced itself into this already complex system. Deviant

³⁶ Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber, ed., *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century*, 4.

entrepreneurs who recognize prohibitions in the mainstream economy as opportunities for maximizing wealth perpetuate this multi-trillion dollar “deviant” trade (in goods, such as narcotics, sex, money laundering, counterfeit material, oil, and illegally harvested timber). As it relates to coca eradication, the U.S. and Colombian governments attempted to disrupt the supply chain of coca, and ultimately, of cocaine by eradicating the primary ingredient at the source. However, because demand for cocaine as measured internationally went largely unchanged, supply chains were altered regularly in reaction to government initiatives to continue the flow of cocaine to where it was demanded. The primary coca growing countries in the Andes prior to Plan Colombia were Peru and Bolivia, and government pressure in those countries forced supply chains to adapt and move north. Just as with any business that reacts to obstacles (either regulatory or physical) that effect supply chains, drug traffickers respond in similar fashion. Every time they moved however, their activities had severe implications (as is discussed later) for the communities affected.

B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NEO-LIBERAL REFORM

The consolidation of globalization (deviant and mainstream) was in part facilitated by the debt crisis of the 1980s, which provided the leverage to speed up financial deregulation, trade liberalization, and privatization in the Global South, particularly in Latin America. The debt crisis and the lost decade followed on from the way many of the petroleum-exporting states, especially in the Middle East, acquired massive profits in the wake of the dramatic increase in oil prices in the 1970s. These so-called petro-dollars were deposited in Western European and North American banks. The banks in turn endeavored to locate borrowers, turning to states in Africa, Asia, and most notably, Latin America. Given the focus of this thesis, it is important to note that by the start of the 1980s, more than 60% of the total foreign debt owed to private banks worldwide was owed by the governments of Latin America. In 1970, the combined foreign debt for all governments in Latin America was USD \$2.3 billion. By 1975, the figure had grown to USD \$75 billion, rising to USD \$229 billion by 1980, and USD \$340

billion by 1983.³⁷ While the legitimate economy slumped during this period, exports of illicit goods, cocaine in particular, grew exponentially, and as demand for narcotics increased in the United States the coca growing countries (Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia) of the Andean region adjusted their supply chain of “cash crops” to meet growing demand from the United States.

Kevin Healy’s work on the agro-industrial side of the cocaine industry traced the rise of coca growing in the Andes in part to official policies taken by governments to stimulate stagnant highland economies. For example, the Bolivian government attempted to increase opportunities for impoverished highland communities by incentivizing their relocation to the more productive lands of the Chapare foothills. These relocation and agricultural development programs (largely funded by the United States) provided the land, and large-scale layoffs (preceded by the privatization of the mining industry) provided the labor, and these factors together with strong demand signals for cocaine from the United States contributed to a scaling up of the coca industry in the region.³⁸ This example narrative linking U.S. led neo-liberal reform to the unintended consolidation and expansion of coca growing in the Chapare is illuminating, and lends itself well to understanding the unintended consequences discussed later in this thesis.

The collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–1991) was also a major boost to neo-liberal economic reform and globalization. The changes in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War converged with and reinforced support for the Washington Consensus, a term coined by John Williamson in 1990. The Washington Consensus encompassed a particular set of neo-liberal and pro-growth economic policies seen to be the standard economic development package for countries and regions that sought growth and access to the global marketplace.³⁹ The privatization of state-run companies in favor of private

³⁷ William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 2009, 1st ed. 2003), 217–218.

³⁸ For more on the organization, evolution, and restructuring of the Andean Cocaine industry, refer to Kevin Healy’s lecture. Kevin Healy, “The Andean Region in the Global Cocaine Economy: Continuities and Change,” *CLAS Latin American Briefing Series, The Center for Latin American, Univ. of Chicago*, July 15, 2011, <http://news.uchicago.edu/multimedia/andean-region-global-cocaine-economy-continuities-and-change-0>.

³⁹ John Williamson and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), *Latin American Adjustment: How Much has Happened?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990).

enterprise, along with liberal trade and investment policies, were the standard prescriptions across much of Latin America throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. The repercussions of this indirect influence the United States had over Latin America (by way of neo-liberal reforms) would turn out to be enormous for the War on Drugs and Plan Colombia as local solutions to local problems were quickly dominated by, and replaced, with U.S. solutions. On the one hand, the pressure to globalize diminished the government's ability to influence large rural sectors throughout the Andes. On the other, globalization provided deviant entrepreneurs with the tools to exploit the lack of governance.

C. THE “HOLLOWING OUT OF THE STATE” AND “TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME”

Globalization, in an uneven but unrelenting fashion, has pushed governments in many parts of the world to the limits of their potential as the arbiters for development within their borders. Central to the argument being made in this thesis about globalization is the “hollowing out of the state.” As global markets expand, the territorial boundaries of states become more irrelevant, and national sovereignty is weakened or completely undermined.⁴⁰ The United States is both a major facilitator of this trend and a much abused and or idealized model. Consider for example Thomas Friedman's suggestion that “America, at its best” is both “a spiritual value” and a “role model” for the world.⁴¹ However, since the 1980s, the U.S. government has focused more on the redirection of government funds away from domestic infrastructure and towards the promotion of neo-liberal economic reform to increase global market share for U.S.-based corporations.⁴² As Jeffrey E. Garten, Dean of the Yale School of Management and former Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade in the first Clinton administration has argued, U.S. companies “have internationalized” in the past 20 or 30 years “more

⁴⁰ Mohammed A. Bamyeh, *The Ends of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 1–8, 52–8; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), xii–xiii, 150–1, 178–9, 197, 201–3.

⁴¹ Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 8, 11–12, 378.

⁴² This is a central theme of Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Cambridge: Princeton University Press, 2008).

than is generally acknowledged.” At the beginning of the 21st century, their supply networks, production systems, labor forces, management, and financing are increasingly globalized. A significant number of Fortune 500 companies now receive over 50% of their income from overseas, while “global diversification” continues to be a key goal of most of the remaining companies in this group. Although the orientation of the Bush administration after September 11 2001 may have shifted (and it should be emphasized that what has occurred is a reorientation, or a military deepening of, rather than a retreat from, globalization), U.S. companies will continue to “have much more interest in an open world economy than in one focused on increasing regulation.”⁴³

Nevertheless, this dynamic and uneven world economy centered on globalization has transformed rather than obviated the role of states. While the rise of globalization has hollowed out the state, state intervention continues to be necessary to participate successfully in mainstream globalization. For example, the elimination of constraints on international financial flows, the privatization of public sectors, and a whole range of changes to financial and economic regulation and control, have occurred because of state interventions.⁴⁴ In many cases, however, the new globalizing state is providing the framework for illicit actors, especially transnational organized crime for which one major source of income is the trade in illegal drugs: Colombia being a key source of cocaine and a key focus of the War on Drugs.

As a result of the shift in power resulting from the “hollowing out” of the state in the developing world, new opportunities were created for illicit actors. Despite Thomas Friedman’s assertions to the contrary, the world isn’t flat, at least not to the extent he describes, and not for everyone equally. What is omitted from his pages is any significant mention of the “dark side” of globalization. Certainly, technology, connectivity, and collaboration have “flattened” the world and are leveling the playing field of global competitiveness.⁴⁵ However, this process is, as has been emphasized, uneven, unfinished,

⁴³ Jerry E. Garten, “From New Economy to Siege Economy: Globalization, Foreign Policy and the CEO Agenda,” *Business and Strategy* no. 26 (2002): 46–7.

⁴⁴ Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 18.

⁴⁵ Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*.

and it is the deviant entrepreneurs of the international marketplace who routinely exploit and have far fewer constraints than legitimate companies and states, and the “monetization of borders” is a greater asset for the former than it is for the latter. For example, of the USD \$65 billion turnover annually of the global market for opiates, only 5–10% (USD \$3–5 billion) is laundered by informal banking systems. The remainder is laundered through legal trade activities and the legal banking system.⁴⁶ This data represents only a fraction of the world’s illicit trade. What it suggests is that illicit actors leverage the same technology and infrastructure as legitimate global trade, but with a greater degree of efficiency. Unlike the legitimate economy in which the beneficiaries are (at least in theory) widespread, the beneficiaries of illicit trade are far more concentrated, and consequently, international transnational organized crime, and money-laundering activities, are significant bases of power and can have significant influence over governance, especially at the local and regional levels of developing nations. Activities, such as human trafficking and the illicit flow of arms, money, drugs, wildlife and counterfeit items, are estimated to amount to USD \$1–3 trillion annually or 7–10% of the world economy, which is a tenfold increase since 1990. This number has been growing seven times faster than legal trade.⁴⁷ The connection between mainstream and deviant globalization and the windfall profits that can be made by “deviant entrepreneurs” is readily apparent in the cocaine industry.

D. THE RISK PREMIUM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

The cocaine industry does not simply respond to demand from consumer countries as is sometimes argued; it also responds to the operating environment of producer, transit, and consumer markets. Similar to legitimate corporations that relocate business activities overseas to take advantage of labor or tax policy differentials, illicit drug enterprises respond in a similar fashion to the “risk premium” associated with producing and bringing the drugs to market. Simply put, the risk premium is the

⁴⁶ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, *Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium* (Vienna, Austria: October 2009), 7.

⁴⁷ World Economic Forum, “A Global Solution to Illicit Trade? Session Summary,” January 29, 2010, <http://www.weforum.org/s?s=illicit+trade>.

additional compensation or return an investor requires for taking on risk. In the investment world, lending money to an established government like the United States, for example, carries a very low chance of default. Investments in the private sector are perceived as riskier than the government, and therefore, have higher risk premiums. The risk premium principle in investing also holds true for the illicit drug trade and is a central component affecting every actor in the value chain, from the coca grower, to the drug trafficker, and ultimately, affects the valuation mechanisms that determine retail prices in the United States.

Contained within the enormous literature on illicit drug trafficking is the repeated reference to the “balloon effect.” According to a UNODC report for example, in 1999, prior to Plan Colombia and aerial eradication program, the number of coca producing departments in Colombia was twelve. By the end of the most intensive periods of the aerial eradication campaign (measured in total hectares sprayed), in 2007, the number of coca producing provinces had skyrocketed to thirty-seven.⁴⁸ Although the “balloon effect” is a useful metaphor to understand and describe the shifting patterns of drug production and trafficking resulting from state sponsored efforts to eradicate and interdict illicit drugs, it falls short of explaining the basic economic principles at work to cause growers and traffickers to move to areas with more favorable conditions. The risk premium is a useful concept to facilitate this understanding, as well as provide the justification for why the coca and cocaine industry has thrived.

The greatest contributor to the value of illicit narcotics, such as cocaine, is the enormous risk associated with producing and bringing the commodity to market. Actively enforced prohibition is the basis for the high prices of illicit commodities, such as cocaine, and ultimately, responsible for the windfall profits earned by transnational organized crime that in turn provides the basis for its power and influence. As the drug war escalates, more coca is eradicated, more traffickers are caught, and more cocaine seized. However, these law enforcement gains are temporary, and drug traffickers quickly adapt to compensate for lost profit. Looking past these short-term gains, the medium to

⁴⁸ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation Final Synthesis Report* (Vienna: UNODC, 2005).

long-term result of law enforcement initiatives is the indirect price support to the industry overall, and it is also a catalyst for expansion and re-penetration of the illicit industry into others regions in the Andes and elsewhere. State sponsored efforts to eradicate and interdict drugs, for example, force risk-averse growers and traffickers to move to areas in which the risks are fewer, the costs of doing business are lower, and profits are higher. Thus, successful eradication tends to create incentives in precisely the wrong direction because temporary production declines drives up farm-gate prices, and thereby, encourages replanting and expansion of cultivation, which eventually reverses the reductions achieved.⁴⁹

As has been demonstrated thus far, globalization has “flattened” the world, and created opportunities where few may have existed. Flat does not mean fair, and opportunities to profit in legitimate “risk free” businesses are limited for many of the residents in the coca growing regions of the Andes. The proliferation of the illicit coca and cocaine industry in the region is a testament to this fact, and those regions left out of the “globalization white-tie party” (either because of institutional or educational limitations, or by choice) have responded to market signals and have pursued an “underground rave party” of their own. Before the implementation of the Washington Consensus, much of Latin America had poor income distribution and some countries had extreme levels of poverty. Afterwards, the situation remained relatively the same. The difference however, was that it now had the tools to compete. The important take away from this example is that the risk premium is too influential to be discounted or to be viewed as a constant. It will fluctuate up and down, dependent on the policy context and law enforcement capacity of the originating country, transit locations, and the destination market.

⁴⁹ Coletta Youngers and John M. Walsh, “Development First: A More Humane and Promising Approach to Reducing Cultivation of Crops for Illicit,” *Washington Office on Latin America*, March 2010, 6, www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2010/WOLA_RPT_Development_web_FNL.pdf.

**E. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE OR MUTUALLY SUPPORTING:
“TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME” AND THE PROHIBITION
REGIME**

As described above, the risk premium associated with the illicit narcotics trade is dependent on its international prohibition. Additionally, the disparate law enforcement capacities of the each of the signatory countries party to the 1988 United Nation’s Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances facilitates the flow of narcotics from producer nations mainly in the developing world to consumer nations predominantly in developed world. “Organizations” that trafficked in narcotics were and in some quarters still are referred to as Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). More recently, however, these organizations have increasingly become known by the term transnational organized crime. This point is important because it demonstrates a somewhat better understanding of the structural evolution that has occurred within and between criminal networks, and clarifies the implication that these organizations are not only global, but also highly diversified. However, even transnational organized crime, as a term, falls short because these are in fact, not organizations in the traditional sense, but rather complex networks operating in a market of crime. Accordingly, national law enforcement agencies have with varying degrees of success sought to respond to the increasingly global character of the trade in illegal narcotics. Writing in 1999, Hans T. van der Veen argued that:

The drug industry is probably the largest and most profitable sector of international crime. The perceived threats of drug consumption and organized crime provide the main justifications for important impulses given in recent years to the development of legislation and the organization of law enforcement. Drug repression thereby increasingly acquires an international character. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral forms of pressure, intervention and collaboration are proliferating between states in the name of suffocating the ever-swelling drug economy. The prohibition regime is thereby, in a rapid pace, extended with the coercive powers of states to intervene in national and international drug markets, but therewith also in the sovereignty of individuals, peoples and countries. Just as individuals might get addicted to the use of drugs, so the societies in which they live are becoming addicted to the money that is generated in

the drug business. This seems to be equally true for the agencies that are assigned the task to control it.⁵⁰

Armed with this understanding of the mischaracterization and narrow view of illicit networks, along with the state of co-dependency that has developed between the narcotics industry and the international prohibition regime, it can be seen how the War on Drugs has come to a stalemate. Armed with an understanding of the connection between transnational organized crime and the prohibition regime in relation to mainstream globalization, the next chapter examines Plan Colombia, which was a major effort to stem the flow of illegal narcotics.

⁵⁰ Hans T. van der Veen, *The International Drug Complex* (Amsterdam: Centre for Drug Research, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1999). Revised in August 2000.

III. PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE EXPANDING PROHIBITION REGIME

What business do we have destroying and leading to the killing of thousands of people in Colombia because we cannot enforce our own laws.⁵¹

-Milton Friedman

The rise and consolidation of globalization has always required a significant amount of inter-state diplomacy, with some level of military underwriting. This connection is reflected in successive versions of U.S. National Security Strategy documents. More specifically, for example, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta asserted earlier this year, that “(a)cross the globe, we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations... whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.”⁵² The close civil-military partnership in relation to globalization does not necessarily equate to direct military intervention, but given the post-Cold War expansion of the role of the U.S. military into a variety of what were traditionally considered non-war-fighting functions, U.S. diplomatic and military initiatives have become almost inseparable. The U.S. military has been a major participant in the War on Drugs, virtually from the outset in the early 1970s, which coincided with the origins and rise of globalization. The role of the U.S. military in the War on Drugs was nowhere more apparent than in its involvement in Plan Colombia. Also of particular significance is the fact that more coca eradication was conducted under the auspices of Plan Colombia than anywhere else in the region.

⁵¹ “Milton Friedman on Drug Policy [Part 2 of 3],” video clip, YouTube, (Washington, DC: America’s Drug Forum), October 23, 2010, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=milton%20friedman%20on%20drug%20policy%20%5Bpart%202%20of%203%5D%2C&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CE0QtwIwAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dzds3_cKOn5M&ei=LzzUT_aYJqjq2AXu2vmaDw&usg=AFQjCNG2uryRVstUqThFA_eRmRpXHiZLdw.

⁵² Leon Panetta, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense Department of Defense,” January 2012.

Plan Colombia formally began in 2000 and was at its peak up to 2005. As already mentioned in the Chapter I, it is the official name of a program that, among other things, provided the institutional framework for bolstering the military alliance between the United States and Colombia in the war against illegal drug production, trafficking, and the organized criminal groups associated with these activities.⁵³ As also observed earlier, Plan Colombia was initially conceived as an aid package that would go beyond anti-drug production and trafficking, and include the peace process (between the Colombian government and the FARC), economic and social development, judicial reform, the improvement of human rights, and democracy-promotion. By the time it was implemented, however, most of the aid took the form of military equipment (helicopters, planes, chemicals to spray the illegal crops, and radar equipment), along with military training at the expense of other stated goals including much needed development. Ultimately, Plan Colombia can be seen as an effort to bring about a series of structural changes in the supply chain of cocaine. This chapter focuses on the effects of the U.S. drug control strategy in Colombia and the region, and considers the widening gap that exists between the far-reaching objectives of Plan Colombia, and what was actually achieved. For the most part, because of the adaptive character of the drug trade, short-term “successes” have not translated in any meaningful way into long-term achievements, such as reduced coca production or a reduction in the quantity of cocaine reaching the U.S. market. Instead, the drug trade has quickly sidestepped repeated attempts at suppression irrespective of national borders. More than 10 years after intensive interdiction and eradication campaigns in Colombia, coca growing and cocaine production has simply shifted elsewhere in the Andes. At the same time, shifting trafficking patterns have brought violence to regions previously unaffected by the drug war. All the while, the cocaine supply has remained steady, a trend that reaches back well before Plan Colombia to the formal declaration of the War on Drugs and earlier.

⁵³ Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo, “The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia,” *Documentos CEDE* 2008–19, October 2008, 2, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485690.

A. THE WAR ON DRUGS

The United States was combating drugs even before President Richard Nixon coined the term “War on Drugs” in 1971.⁵⁴ Since then, numerous approaches and funding initiatives have attempted to reduce drug trafficking into the U.S. During the early days of the War on Drugs, U.S. policy makers viewed it as a social problem that could potentially be cured via the treatment and rehabilitation of those using the drug concerned. However, the 1970s drug epidemic changed the prevailing view, and shifted the emphasis from prevention and treatment to viewing it primarily as a law enforcement problem. To this end, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created in 1973.⁵⁵ This new government agency represented a strategic change in direction in relation to combating the distribution and use of illicit drugs, and was indicative of the new approach to drug enforcement led by a growing and empowered prohibition regime. Meanwhile, the rapid growth of the global cocaine industry during this period fundamentally transformed U.S.-Latin American relations. Nowhere is this change more apparent than in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; the three countries that formed the “silver triangle” of cocaine production in the Andean region. Antinarcotics policy has come to dominate the debate in Washington about relations with these three nations, while more urgent problems, such as the region’s unmanageable debt, economic disarray, and political instability, have been relegated to the sidelines.⁵⁶

The dramatic rise in cocaine use by the mid-1980s and the related violence in the United States prompted many of the subsequent hard-hitting drug control policies. Three years after President Reagan (1981–1988) declared that the War on Drugs was a national security imperative, his successor and former vice president, George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) embarked on the “global war against narco-trafficking.” In his inaugural address,

⁵⁴ Rachel Neild, “U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 68.

⁵⁵ Adam Isacson, “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 19.

⁵⁶ Peter Andreas and Coletta Youngers, “U. S. Drug Policy and the Andean Cocaine Industry,” *World Policy Journal* 6, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 529.

the first President Bush referred to drug trafficking as a “clear and present danger” threatening the national security of the United States,⁵⁷ which was followed by the launch of the Andean Initiative that sought to reduce the supply of drugs by curbing drug production in and seizing shipments from the so-called source countries. The focus of the initiative was to empower military and police forces in the region to conduct counterdrug operations backed, of course, by U.S. training and material support.⁵⁸ This was the beginning of a lasting trend for U.S. drug strategy favoring militarization at the expense of other stated goals, such as socioeconomic development and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

For four decades, the war on drugs has persisted. From the outset and to the present, the major components of U.S. drug control policy have been interdiction, especially cocaine shipments, and the eradication of coca crops across much of the coca-growing regions of the Andes. The principle targets of U.S. eradication campaigns since the beginning of the “war on drugs” have been Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Eradication policy is driven by the premise that eliminating coca plants will lead to a decrease in the production of cocaine that, gradually reduces the supply in the United States. As cocaine becomes scarcer, prices will increase thereby discouraging its use. However, as has been emphasized, illicit drug markets have proven exceptionally difficult to control, particularly from the supply-side. Despite “successful” eradication programs in Peru and Bolivia in the late-1990s, coca cultivation moved north, and Colombia became the largest coca growing and cocaine producing country in the world.⁵⁹

During this period, a partial shift away from interdiction and a renewed emphasis on crop eradication occurred. The reasoning was that interdiction was expensive and complicated, required the deployment of U.S. forces, establishment and maintenance of overseas bases, operations in international waters, close cooperation with host nation

⁵⁷ Mario A. Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization* (Toronto, Ontario: Hushion House, 2004), 124.

⁵⁸ Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The US War on Drugs: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 3.

⁵⁹ Bigwood and Coffin, “Coca Eradication.”

security forces, and a litany of other complexities. On the other hand, eradication was perceived as simple because crops are out in the open and “they don’t move.” Under President Clinton, eradication became the preferred approach to drug control throughout the 1990s.⁶⁰ In Bolivia and Peru, police and military forces participated in manual eradication; literally pulling the coca crops out of the ground by hand. In Colombia, however, the situation was more complicated because of escalating violence from armed groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). As these groups were highly dependent on the drug trade to finance their activities, and would likely fervently defend their main source of income, it was decided that manual eradication was not a viable option. As a result, Colombia became the only country in the region to allow aerial spraying of herbicides. Fumigation, as the preferred eradication technique, grew rapidly from 5,600 hectares in 1996 to 127,000 hectares in 2003.⁶¹ As seen in Chapter IV, the increased emphasis on coca eradication, leading up to and during Plan Colombia, was to have significant unintended consequences.

B. MAKING PLAN COLOMBIA

As mentioned earlier, Colombian President Andres Pastrana proposed the original idea of Plan Colombia. As Mario Murillo observed, and is worth quoting at length, the earlier language of the plan focused on the needs of the countryside and the profound poverty that fueled the conflict:

Plan Colombia initially was a development strategy for the areas most affected by the conflict and most marginalized in terms of basic human necessities. Modeled after the post-World War II Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe, it addressed the many conditions behind the drug trade and the internal armed conflict, such as economic inequality, lack of opportunities for progress, especially for Colombian youth, and an unequal distribution of land. It also addressed questions relating to the collapse and general lack of institutional legitimacy and the minimal capacity to govern on the part of local and national authorities. It raised issues such as respect for human rights and the creation of truly

⁶⁰ Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” 117.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

participatory democracy as necessary steps in eradicating the fundamental seeds of the conflict. Even among traditional critics of Colombian state policies, such as members of NGOs, human rights activists, and sectors of the different social movements, there was some room for optimism with Pastrana's approach to the problem.⁶²

The Colombian President's proposed \$7 billion reconstruction program was revised and eventually emerged as a commitment from Washington to provide \$1.3 billion in aid, more than 70% of which would be directed toward military and security measures designed to fight the "drug war."

U.S. funding for Plan Colombia came out of an earlier program known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY2000 through FY2005 was USD \$2.8 billion. If military assistance from the DoD and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is included, the total U.S. support to Colombia is USD \$4.5 billion.⁶³ Although some overlap in goals existed between the two countries, the primary U.S. objective was to slow the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and promote peace and economic development in the region. The original plan also included counterinsurgency objectives, but as the Plan Colombia proposal worked its way through Capitol Hill, counterinsurgency objectives were dropped over fears of another Vietnam-like, costly, non-winnable, jungle insurgency.⁶⁴

In time, however, Plan Colombia evolved away from its counter-narcotic and development roots, and was increasingly reoriented back towards counterinsurgency. U.S. assistance totaling nearly USD \$4.9 billion between 2000 and 2008 provided the Colombian military and National Police with a range of capabilities primarily air mobility, which was needed to pursue Plan Colombia's counter-narcotics and security

⁶² Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*, 126.

⁶³ Connie Veillette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report* (Washington, DC, USA: UNT Digital Library, 2005).

⁶⁴ United States Agency International Development, *Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Government's Support for Plan Colombia's Illicit Crop Reduction Components* (Washington, DC: Management Systems International, April 17, 2009), 3.

objectives.⁶⁵ This shift in resources towards the military and police and a strategy based on interdiction and eradication was due in part because of 9/11 and because of the escalating violence in Colombia from armed groups, such as FARC, ELN, and AUC. In the wake of 9/11, Washington expanded the highly controversial program of aerial fumigation of coca plantations in southern Colombia; a policy that had been the focus of massive resistance on the part of the peasant coca farmers in previous years.⁶⁶

C. RESULTS OF PLAN COLOMBIA

The results of Plan Colombia can be accessed from three perspectives: the reported numeric assessments of key metrics, the U.S. perspective, and the Colombian perspective. Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by targeting coca cultivation was not met. The general finding in terms of reduced coca production appears to have been negligible. Even the steep declines in production as a result of eradication in 2002 and 2003 was not translated into strategic success; namely, deep and sustainable reductions in the production of coca leaf and the availability of cocaine in the U.S.⁶⁷ Reductions in Colombia's estimated cocaine production have been largely offset by a return of cocaine production to Peru and Bolivia, which had actually been the original production hubs prior to the 1970s.⁶⁸ The U.S.-led fumigation program sprayed herbicide on more than 380,000 hectares of coca, which was equivalent to 8% of Colombia's arable land.⁶⁹ Aerial fumigation of coca plantations has continued almost without interruption, despite the fact that human rights groups have cited it as a primary cause of the recent displacements of thousands of civilians from their homes who are forced to flee into neighboring Ecuador or other departments in southern Colombia.⁷⁰ Despite record highs in the fumigation campaign,

⁶⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*, 14.

⁶⁶ Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*, 146.

⁶⁷ Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, "Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War," 113.

⁶⁸ Marcella, "Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives," 32.

⁶⁹ Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, "Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War," 113.

⁷⁰ Murillo, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*, 146.

the net result was effectively zero as the decline in coca cultivation in one area was met with an increase in other regions deeper in the countryside.⁷¹

An additional unintended consequence relating to coca eradication as represented by Figure 1, was that the productivity per hectare of coca almost doubled, which effectively nullified any reductions overall. Writing for *Wired Magazine* in 2004, Joshua Davis investigated rumors of a new (new at the end of 2004) herbicide resistant strain of coca known in the Andes as *Boliviana negra*. He noted that:

The herbicide, known by its brand name, Roundup, is the key ingredient in the US-financed, billion-dollar aerial coca fumigation campaign that is a cornerstone of America's war on drugs...the farmers of the region may have used selective breeding to develop a hardier strain of coca. If a plant happened to demonstrate herbicide resistance, it would be more widely cultivated, and clippings would be either sold or, in many cases, given away or even stolen by other farmers. Such a peer-to-peer network could, over time, result in a coca crop that can withstand large-scale aerial spraying campaigns. But experts in herbicide resistance suspect that there is another, more intriguing possibility: The coca plant may have been genetically modified in a lab. The technology is fairly trivial. In 1996, Monsanto commercialized its patented Roundup Ready soybean - a genetically modified plant impervious to glyphosate. The innovation ushered in an era of hyper-efficient soybean production: Farmers were able to spray entire fields, killing all the weeds and leaving behind a thriving soybean crop. The arrival of Roundup Ready coca would have a similar effect - except that in this case, it would be the US doing the weed killing for the drug lords. Whether its resistance came from selective breeding or genetic modification, the new strain poses a significant foreign-policy challenge to the U.S.⁷²

As far as reducing the supply of cocaine in the United States, Plan Colombia fell far short of the 50% reduction benchmark. Based on these metrics, Plan Colombia cannot be viewed as a success in that coca cultivation did not fall significantly overall, and the price of cocaine remained relatively stable.

⁷¹ Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, "Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War," 113.

⁷² Joshua Davis, "The Mystery of the Coca Plant That Wouldn't Die," *Wired Magazine*, no. 12.11, November 2004, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.11/columbia.html>.

	Before Plan Colombia	After Plan Colombia
Final price	\$37,900	\$35,862
Domestic price	\$1,485	\$1,860
Final supply from Colombia	561,000 kgs	474,000 kgs
Domestic supply	687,500 kgs	645,000 kgs
Hectares with cocaine	161,700 has	82,000 has
Productivity per hectare	4.25 kgs/ha/year	7.86 kgs/ha/year
% of land with cocaine crops	32.3%	16.4%
Seizures by Colombian Authorities	87,000	113,000
% not Seized	87.2%	81.8%
Colombia expenses (assuming a 35% increase)	\$420 million	566 million
USA Expenses	0	\$465 million
Supply in consumer countries	718,000 kgs	745,000 kgs
% of US cocaine supplied by Colombia	78%	63%

Figure 1. Mejia and Restrepo, Summary of the Main Fact About the Cocaine Market and the War on Before and After Plan Colombia.⁷³

In the wake of Plan Colombia, the Alvaro Uribe administration (2002–2010) made major economic progress. In 2004, for example, Colombia led Latin America and was second overall in the world in improving its investment climate, which helped to boost job creation and economic growth. The jobless rate in the country's 13 largest cities dropped to 14.1 percent in October from 14.9 percent in September and 15.4 percent in October 2003.⁷⁴ The improved security condition has also improved the business climate in Colombia as more multinational companies are seeking to invest in Colombia, which underscores the interdependence between economic development and security.

⁷³ Mejía and Restrepo, "The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia," 49.

⁷⁴ Robert Willis, "Colombia Cited by World Bank as Unemployment Falls," *Bloomberg.com*, November 30, 2004, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=aGPAAt69GHh_E&refer=latin_america.

D. THE U.S. SCALE

The official U.S. rhetoric surrounding Plan Colombia is positive. According to the State Department, the success of Plan Colombia is real and measurable, and has helped Colombia fight narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and transnational crime; promote economic and social development; assist conflict victims; strengthen democratic institutions, including human rights mechanisms and the justice system; and begin a process to demobilize and reintegrate illegal armed groups.⁷⁵ Measured in real numbers against some of Plan Colombia's other goals, however, the successes are not as convincing. The goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50% in six years was not achieved, which, in part, can be explained by neglecting strategies to combat U.S. demand for illicit drugs, measures taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts, such as moving deeper into the jungle, and even simple techniques like covering plants with plastic.

By 2008, as mentioned earlier, the cost of the military portion of Plan Colombia had reached USD \$4.9 billion. These funds were provided to the Colombian Military and National Police and were used to fund air mobility, helicopters, and other vehicles required to allow for the rapid movement of the Colombian counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency forces.⁷⁶ In addition, the United States provided other equipment, training, advisors, and intelligence to aid in the professionalization of Colombia's forces. The results included the eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the capture or killing of illegal and armed group leaders and combatants, and the seizure of tons of cocaine.⁷⁷

Additionally, the U.S. provided over USD \$1.2 billion to Colombia via the State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice for a variety of programs targeting economic, social, and justice

⁷⁵ Excerpt from Dept of State briefing. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "Future Engagement and Partnership With Latin America."

⁷⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance.*

⁷⁷ Ibid.

programs. The results of these programs included helping displaced persons, and altering and reforming the justice system in Colombia. These efforts, however, were relatively slow in meeting their goals while other programs and results were difficult to assess.⁷⁸ Despite a large portion of non-military aid going to alternative development and job creation, the initiatives were not provided in most of the regions in which coca was cultivated. Additionally, little analysis was conducted to determine if these programs really meshed with their goals of decreasing the production of drugs and achieving sustainable results.⁷⁹ Overall, these programs, in conjunction with the other non-military programs, appear to have resulted in modest improvements in some of Colombia's neglected regions and limited reformation of Colombia's judicial branch.

E. THE COLOMBIAN SCALE

The official Colombian government position on the results of Plan Colombia is positive. Since 2002, Colombia has experienced an unprecedented period of economic expansion, social development, and increased security. Through a series of bold reforms, the government has fostered the growth of the Colombian economy, increased government transparency, investment in social welfare programs, and a significant reduction of the level of violence in the country.⁸⁰

The Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010), initiated a policy based on a platform of *restoring confidence*, along three pillars: democratic security, investment with social responsibility, and social cohesion based on freedom. Since 2000, U.S. assistance enabled the Colombians to achieve significant security advances in two key areas. First, the government has expanded its presence throughout the country and has displaced illegal armed groups. Second, through its counter-narcotics strategy, military and police actions, it has degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened their operational capabilities.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*.

⁸⁰ Embassy of Colombia, "Colombia: A Success Story, Restoring Confidence."

The security situation has greatly improved by any measure. In 2009, terrorist acts were down 84% from 2002, homicides were lower by 45% (lowest homicide rate in 22 years), and kidnappings dropped significantly, down by 88% from 2002; the lowest rate in 22 years.⁸¹ Under the policy of *restoring confidence*, Colombia has reformed its judicial and law enforcement institutions, experienced substantial economic growth, and provided vital social services. Progress in Colombia is undeniable, and has put the nation firmly on the path of peace, justice and security.⁸²

Another benefit of the drug war has been the modernization of the Colombian military and police forces. According to Colombia's National Planning Department, the total military component of Colombian expenses in the War on Drugs under Plan Colombia has been about USD \$566 million per year since 2000, with the U.S. contribution totaling approximately USD \$465 million per year in subsidies to the military forces of Colombia. Although official estimates for the level of Colombian expenses in the war against drug production and trafficking before Plan Colombia are unavailable, estimates for military and defense expenditures as a share of GDP do exist. Before Plan Colombia, this share was about 3.25% and, after Plan Colombia, had increased to about 4.3 percent. In other words, between 1999–2000 and 2005–2006, total military and defense expenditures as a share of GDP increased by about 32 percent.⁸³ Pursuant to the "Leahy Amendment," U.S. assistance to the Colombian military may only be provided to units that have been vetted for human rights abuses as certified by the Secretary of State. Since fiscal year 2000, the DOS data indicates that USAID has provided over USD \$150 million to support the rule of law in Colombia through human rights protection, the creation of conflict resolution centers, and training of public defenders, among other activities.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Embassy of Colombia, "Colombia: A Success Story, Restoring Confidence."

⁸³ Mejía Daniel, and Pascual Restrepo. "The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia." *Documentos CEDE* 2008–19. October 2008. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485690.

⁸⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*, 57.

Nevertheless, in terms of human rights violations, Plan Colombia continues to be a source of contention for civil right's activists who claim that not enough assistance is given to this area. Colombian officials claim that neither the Justice and Peace Unit nor the Human Rights Unit has enough investigators and prosecutors to execute their missions fully. For example, 45 prosecutors from the Human Rights Unit have to cover more than 4,000 assigned cases. From 2002 to 2007, the unit produced less than 400 convictions, and the lack of support has meant that potentially thousands more crimes remain unknown. As of October 2007, over 3,000 known gravesites had not been exhumed and less than half of the recovered human remains had been identified.⁸⁵ Although the true number will never be known, during the period between 2002 and 2008, human rights groups estimate that conflict-related civilian deaths totaled 14,000, which is separate and apart from the nearly 21,000 soldiers, police, guerillas, and paramilitary forces killed in this period.⁸⁶

Many Colombians, meanwhile, are convinced that U.S. counter-narcotics efforts are simply a pretext for continued U.S. dominance in the region. They believe that what the United States ultimately wants is control over Colombia's natural resources, especially its oil fields in the northern regions.⁸⁷ Given the history of oil exploration in Colombia, and the indifference that multinationals and the government have shown toward indigenous communities in general, indigenous activists, environmentalists, and human rights workers had reason to be concerned about the links between Plan Colombia and oil interests, and many Colombian politicians and intellectual are highly suspicious of Washington's intent in the region.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Honorable, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, PLAN COLOMBIA, Drug Reduction Goals, Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*, 61.

⁸⁶ Adam Isacson, *Don't Call it a Model: On Plan Colombia's Tenth Anniversary, Claims of Success Don't Stand Up to Scrutiny* (Washington Office On Latin America (WOLA), July 14, 2010).

⁸⁷ Murillo, Mario A. *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*. Toronto, Ontario: Hushion House, 2004. 138.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

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IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF COCA ERADICATION

We are expecting them to produce tons of fruit and vegetables to transport on trucks they do not have, on roads that literally do not exist, to sell in globalized markets against which they cannot compete.

-NGO official working on alternative development programs in Colombia

With an understanding of the deviant globalization framework, Chapter III examined the rise and scale of the cocaine industry in Colombia, and also provided a clear idea of how, in a highly interconnected world economy in which products (licit and illicit) move freely, a policy based on coca eradication was/is ill-suited to stem the flow of narcotics if demand remains constant. Finally, the previous chapter also elucidated that at the official level in Washington and Bogota, Plan Colombia was and continues to be viewed as a success despite the evidence to suggest otherwise. The official perspectives are both highly politicized and narrowly focused, which is especially worrisome since Plan Colombia has been viewed in some quarters as a counternarcotic and development model that could be replicated in other Latin American countries, such as Mexico.

Over the last decade, considerable progress has been made in developing a greater understanding of the impact of eradication and rural development in coca growing areas. Some of the problems realized stem from improper sequencing of eradication and alternative development. According to a UNODC report from an International Workshop on Alternative Development, some key findings directly related to crop eradication were known well in advance of Plan Colombia and could have served as a warning when prospective policies were being considered. For example, a 1998 United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS) Action Plan warned, "In areas where alternative development programs have not yet created viable alternative income

opportunities, the application of forced eradication might endanger the success of alternative development programs.”⁸⁹

As was emphasized in the previous chapter, more coca eradication occurred during and in the immediate wake of Plan Colombia than anywhere else in the world. The areas most affected were also the areas of the highest unemployment and least state presence, which made alternative development difficult, if not impossible, to implement effectively.

The extent and severity of the unintended consequences of coca eradication in Colombia call into question whether or not Plan Colombia can be considered a success. It is important to emphasize that one of the primary goals of Plan Colombia was to reduce the supply of cocaine flowing into the United States by 50 percent. As noted by UNODC, many alternative development projects measure their success in terms of reduction in cultivation. This is questionable as an appropriate measure of success because it ignores the conditions under which opium poppy and coca are cultivated, and the common problem of replanting following eradication.⁹⁰ As Plan Colombia progressed, and the unintended consequences of the eradication policy became increasingly clear, the definition of success began to change. When it became apparent that a significant reduction in the supply of coca had not occurred, this particular goal was set aside in favor of other more flattering less tangible metrics of success, such as reduced corruption and judicial reform.⁹¹

The cocaine supply chain, meanwhile, was largely uninterrupted. In fact, by eradicating coca, the U.S. and Colombian governments have maintained the risk premium that supports everyone up and down the value chain of the cocaine industry including the

⁸⁹ UNODC, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Fifty-fifth Session, Vienna, March 12–16, 2012, Item 6 (b) of the provisional agenda*, Implementation of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem: Supply Reduction and Related Measures, March 5, 2012, 9–10, http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-session55/ECN72012_CRP3_eV1251320.pdf.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 9.

⁹¹ For more information regarding the dubious claims regarding the success of Plan Colombia, see Adam Isacson, “Don’t Call It a Model: On Plan Colombia’s Tenth Anniversary, Claims of “Success” Don’t Stand Up to Scrutiny,” *WOLA*, July 14, 2010, <http://justf.org/files/pubs/notmodel.pdf>.

prohibition regime (military and police). In this increasingly connected world in which demand for cocaine has not decreased, the loosely organized but highly adaptable network of coca growers, processors, traffickers, and retailers have found ways to nullify the multi-billion dollar government initiative to put them out of business. In fact, areas that had seen reductions in coca production are now thriving once again, and the market for cocaine has expanded to countries within the region, such as Brazil, and also to Europe. In addition to issues previously mentioned, the research also identified the following unintended consequences relating to coca eradication: political instability, social consequences, such as migration and displacement, and environmental and health consequences. To help visualize how the aerial fumigation of drug crops in Colombia set in motion a vicious circle of human, social and environmental destruction, the following model was borrowed from a publication entitled “A Vicious Circle: The Chemical and Biological “War on Drugs.””




Figure 2. Martin Jelsma Model for Visualizing the Unintended Consequences of Crop Eradication⁹²

A. UNINTENDED POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: UNDERMINING THE STATE

The principle divisions that led to ongoing and violent political conflict in Colombia have been along class lines, as opposed to ethnic lines. The guerrilla insurgency in Colombia, which dated back to the 1960s if not earlier, represented a prolonged rural rebellion in a rapidly modernizing and urbanizing society, which over the

⁹² Martin Jelsma created this model to help visualize how aerial fumigation of drug crops in Colombia set in motion a vicious circle of human, social and environmental destruction. The model appeared in the report, "A Vicious Circle: The Chemical and Biological "War on Drugs,"" *Transnational Institute*, March 2001, 4, and is used here with permission from the author. To view full report, visit: <http://www.tni.org/archives/know/163>.

same period, has become ever more deeply intertwined with the international narcotics trade. This overlay of national and transnational organized crime has obscured the political dimensions of the conflict, leaving U.S. and Colombian policy makers focused on the prevention of narcotics production.⁹³ This dynamic was only made worse by the 9/11 attacks, and as mentioned previously, placed a military solution at the center of the War on Drugs and the conflict with the various insurgency groups in Colombia.

By appreciating that the FARC has coexisted with rural communities for decades and recruits most of its soldiers from the rural areas in which it operates, it is possible to begin to understand how the eradication policy ran counter to state legitimacy and bolstered the position of insurgency groups relative to the rural populace. In many rural areas in which the percentage of the people living below the poverty line was 82% in 2000, the FARC represented one of the only effective sources of employment and opportunity for the populace.⁹⁴ These poor farmers became so dependent on coca growing and cocaine production for their livelihood that they would fight any government attempt to eliminate it. Colombia's dire economic conditions and limited reach outside of urban areas not only ensured the FARC a steady stream of recruits, it also led to increasing numbers of people migrating to rebel-controlled regions, particularly in the east and south in which the rebel group functioned as the de facto government providing social services, education, and law and order.⁹⁵ As the state was being "hollowed out" to be more competitive internationally, what was happening is that non-state actors were consolidating their power and influence throughout the Colombian countryside.

Up until the early 1990s, Peru and Bolivia were the principle cultivators of coca. After U.S. sponsored coca eradication intensified in those countries, Colombian drug trafficking operations (which previously purchased coca leaves for processing to coca paste) saw an opportunity to monopolize the value chain, and between 1995 and 2000,

⁹³ Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, and John Tirman, *Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 51.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 70.

⁹⁵ Garry M. Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency* (Halifax: Fernwood, 2011), 38.

doubled their coca growing efforts on Colombian soil.⁹⁶ The combination of U.S.-sponsored eradication campaigns in Peru and Bolivia, economic hardships related to weakened economy, implementation of neoliberal reforms that “hollowed out” the state in Colombia, and an increased concentration of land ownership resulting from paramilitary groups displacing peasants to frontier regions, worked together to set the conditions for coca growing to flourish in Colombia.⁹⁷ Nazih Richani captured this dynamic situation well by describing it as follows:

Coca and other illicit plantations generated a reverse migration process; the unemployed migrated from the cities to areas of colonization. The sociopolitical implications of such a process have been multifaceted, affecting the social fabric of these areas whereby the relatively stable old peasant settlements of twenty or more years mix uneasily with an impetus of new migrants seeking the coca rush.⁹⁸

Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, coca growing became an important source of economic survival for an expanding population of over one million peasants in rural Colombia, who in turn, depended upon groups, such as the FARC, for protection.⁹⁹

In this way, a symbiotic relationship was established. The FARC provided peasants with protection from paramilitary groups, and other benefits such as education and infrastructure development that the state did not provide. In return, the peasants provided the FARC with tax revenue of between 7% and 10% of the market value of coca paste, significant revenues that the FARC used to better train and equip its fighters. The deteriorating economic conditions outside of the coca growing regions and the escalating dirty war being promulgated by paramilitary groups ensured a steady flow of workers to FARC-held regions and allowed the FARC to expand throughout rural Colombia.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Fact Sheet: Colombia, U.N. Discussion on Anti Coca Mycoherbicide Cooperation*, July 17, 2000.

⁹⁷ Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, 60.

⁹⁸ Nazih Richani, *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia* (Albany, NY: State Univ of New York Press, 2002), 72.

⁹⁹ Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, 62.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Colombia has a long history of internal conflict and strife; for many years non-state actors competed directly and indirectly against the state, and more recently, the military, for power. The situation in the country continued to be bleak as Plan Colombia unfolded after 2000. Much of the rural population, either directly engaged in coca production or displaced by violence and unrepresented by the state, was already strongly aligned or susceptible to insurgent groups and paramilitary organizations that themselves represented the interests of wealthy landowners. While Colombia has made some gains in the area of security, institutional consolidation has remained relatively fragile, unable to investigate fully or rein in the number of human rights violations conducted in particular by paramilitary groups. Referred to locally as “parapolitics” the term refers to the situation in which political heavyweights (including high-ranking officials, such as Senator Mario Uribe, cousin of President Uribe), many of whom are well connected, hold high government positions, or are large landholders with ties to narco-trafficking—fostered and funded brutal pro-government paramilitary groups. These groups engaged in scorched-earth tactics (marked by hundreds of gruesome massacres and mass graves) and killed tens of thousands of noncombatants in the 1990s and early 2000s. At their worst, they readily surpassed the guerrillas and the armed forces as Colombia’s worst human rights violators.¹⁰¹

Moreover, Colombia’s strong alignment with the U.S. military with its preference for widespread fumigation undermined the credibility of the Colombian state; the preoccupation with coca eradication suggested, to many Colombians that the state was not serious about development. With the local branch of the state providing few alternatives to the stable and profitable income derived from coca growing, local farmers have had little or no incentive to consider other means for their livelihood. For example, many alternative development programs have been hindered by lack of infrastructure and other deficiencies. As one NGO expert put it, “We are expecting them to produce tons of

¹⁰¹ Isacson, “Don’t Call It a Model: On Plan Colombia’s Tenth Anniversary, Claims of “Success” Don’t Stand Up to Scrutiny,” 4.

fruit and vegetables to transport on trucks they do not have, on roads that literally do not exist, to sell in globalized markets against which they cannot compete.”¹⁰²

To compound the problem of government legitimacy in rural areas, promises to support farmers financially during their transition to alternative legal crops were not honored. In 2001, a group of 62 international NGOs wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressing this concern and informed him that after six months following the agreements, residents had received no compensation for halting their production of coca.¹⁰³ Given that traffickers regularly came through with their payments to the farmers, and that funds promised by the state were recurrently delayed or “lost” altogether, rural communities like those of the Putumayo region were hard pressed to find good reasons to abandon coca production in favor of alternative development options.

Furthermore, the government’s neglect of pressing social issues resulting from forced eradication led many Colombians to seek refuge among some of the rebel groups targeted by military and police forces. According to a Human Rights Watch report on Colombian child soldiers, for example, many children and youth joined guerilla groups “simply ...out of hunger.”¹⁰⁴ Others who had their farm of food crops wrongly fumigated sought reparations under a government compensation program. However, this program also failed to meet expectations. Of the 8,570 official complaints received by the Colombian government, only 117 complaints were found to be valid. Seeing this program as a waste of time because of the inadequate government response, farmers stopped filing complaints for compensation. Faced with the possibility of fumigation and with no other way to make a living in these remote ungoverned spaces, farmers resumed growing coca. The political instability and shifting power structure of the rural areas created many hardships for the residents

¹⁰² Sanho Tree, comments from presentation at Bogota University, September 2009 as reported in Human Rights Watch, Human Rights and Drug Policy: Crop Eradication, Briefing 6 (Alternative Development).

¹⁰³ Nataly Fletcher, “Advocates or Obstacles? NGOs and Plan Colombia,” *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Winter 2003): 22–24.

¹⁰⁴ Carolina Pineda, “Plan Colombia A Political, Economic, and Cultural Analysis of Coca and Poppy Eradication Projects in Putumayo, Colombia Totem,” *The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology* 13, no. 1, art. 10 (2005): 79.

B. UNINTENDED SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: MIGRATION AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Unlike refugees who flee war-torn areas and cross national borders to benefit from an internationally recognized system of protection, persons forcibly displaced within national borders as a result of armed conflict and regular violations of their human rights lack comparable protection. As a result of the armed conflict that engulfed Colombia over much of the past four decades, a humanitarian crisis developed which places Colombia just behind Sudan in terms of global displacement figures and at the head of Latin America's long list of socio-political emergencies. In the case of Colombia, coca eradication has contributed to internal displacement. In fact, while the levels of violent conflict and/or coca eradication have declined, internal displacement has at best leveled out. Colombia still has roughly four million forcibly displaced persons within its borders.¹⁰⁵

In response to the alarming level of internal displacement, the Colombian Constitutional Court assumed a central role and had a significant impact on government policy and its response to the needs and vulnerabilities of its internally displaced citizens. In issuing Decision T-025 in 2004, the court declared that an "unconstitutional state of affairs" existed because of the gap between the rights guaranteed to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by domestic law, and the insufficient resources and institutional capacity of the government to protect these rights.¹⁰⁶ Having declared the existence of an unconstitutional state of affairs, the court issued a number of complex orders aimed at overcoming the problems that gave rise to this situation and protecting the rights of the country's entire displaced population. In addition to establishing minimum mandatory levels of protection for IDPs, the National Council for Comprehensive Assistance to the Population Displaced by Violence (CNAIP) was granted a two-month period to determine the resources required to meet the minimum level of protection as determined by law. Upon reviewing this landmark (albeit toothless) judgment in relation to the

¹⁰⁵ Rodolfo Arango, *Judicial Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: The Colombian Experience* (The Brookings Institution: University of Bern, Project on Internal Displacement, November 2009), Forward. For more information on IDPs, go to <http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp>.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

eradication of illicit crops, the flaws in this decision become readily apparent. As noted by Rodolfo Arango, because aerial fumigation in itself is not violent, it is common practice to refuse IDP recognition to persons who flee areas of crop fumigation.¹⁰⁷ IDPs continue to be a serious unintended consequence of coca eradication, and this approach regarding IDP status contributes to the delegitimizing of the state, and forces IDPs to seek support and protection elsewhere.

The UN is responsible for outlining the legislative parameters under which the eradication of illicit crops is executed. While the 1998 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances excuses the legal cultivation of some crops for scientific and medicinal purposes, the convention prohibits all other cultivation and states that illicit crops shall be eradicated and removed. However, it also mentions that all measures adopted for eradication shall respect fundamental human rights. Despite the safeguards outlined by the UN, studies show that crop eradication has heightened humanitarian crises, especially in the case of Plan Colombia. This thesis does not assert that U.S. sponsored manual and aerial illicit crop eradication is the primary cause of IDPs in Colombia. Such a claim would be impossible to prove considering the several interrelated and preexisting forces that have come together to encourage displacement. Mounting evidence exists, however, that the socioeconomic disruption and intensified violence produced by Colombia's fumigation strategy displaces thousands of rural Colombians each year and contributes to the movement of coca growing to new areas.¹⁰⁸

Colombia's nongovernmental Council for Human Rights and Displacement estimates that in 2001 and 2002—the two years following Plan Colombia's inception—fumigation alone displaced more than 75,000 people nationwide.¹⁰⁹ In their 2008 study, Michelle Dion and Catherine Russler concluded that aerial eradication contributes to

¹⁰⁷ Arango, *Judicial Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: The Colombian Experience*, 96.

¹⁰⁸ Witness for Peace, Fundacion Minga and Institute for Policy Studies, "An Exercise in Futility: Nine Years of Fumigation in Colombia," 2007, 5, http://witnessforpeace.org/downloads/An_Exercise_in_Futility.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "UNODC Fact Sheet—Colombia Coca Survey For 2004."

internal displacement through its disruption of both legal and illegal cultivation, and the violence associated with military efforts to secure areas for eradication operations. Colombia's eradication strategies clearly intensified displacement in areas targeted for fumigation as the state, guerrilla and paramilitary elements struggled for military, economic and popular control.¹¹⁰ Their study revealed that displacement disrupts all types of agricultural activity and labor markets, and that in sum, aerial eradication has had a small and statistically insignificant direct effect on coca cultivation in Colombia. In short, they found that the greatest deterrent to coca cultivation is strong state presence, and to a lesser extent, fumigation. In fact, their evidence found that elements of Colombia's floating population migrate to coca-producing regions specifically in search of the economic opportunities afforded by the illicit drug industry.¹¹¹

C. UNINTENDED ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES: AERIAL FUMIGATION AND DEFORESTATION

The debate continues regarding the environmental and human health consequences associated with the widespread aerial spraying of herbicides in areas known or suspected to be growing illicit drug crops. Of all the drug-producing countries in Latin America, Colombia is the only country that has succumbed to U.S. economic and political pressure and allowed uninterrupted aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy.

The active ingredient used in the aerial eradication program in Colombia is glyphosate, which is one of the most commonly used agricultural herbicides in the world, and a variant of the widely known product called Roundup. It has been tested widely in the United States, Colombia, and elsewhere. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) originally approved glyphosate for general use in 1974 and re-registered it in 1993. The EPA has approved its use on food croplands, forests, residential areas, and

¹¹⁰ Michelle L. Dion and Catherine Russler, "Eradication Efforts, the State, Displacement and Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 40, no. 03 (2008): 404, http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022216X08004380.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 404.

around aquatic areas, and it continues to be one of the top five pesticides, including herbicides, used in the United States.¹¹²

Despite the continued approval of its use by the EPA, critics, such as the group of scientists led by biochemist Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini, from the University of Caen in France, found that human placental cells are sensitive to Roundup at concentrations levels far lower than those used in the eradication operation in Colombia. A study of farming populations in Ontario demonstrated that exposure to glyphosate, the key ingredient in Roundup, nearly doubled the risk of late miscarriages and may help explain the high levels of premature births and miscarriages observed among female farmers using glyphosate. The study also confirmed that the toxicity effects of glyphosate increases in the presence of Roundup ‘adjuvants’ or additives, which renders Roundup twice as toxic as its isolated active ingredient, glyphosate.¹¹³

On the other side of the argument are the official positions the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) section of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Colombian, U.S., and British governments. Upon official request, an in-depth study and assessment of the human health and environmental effects regarding the use of glyphosate was conducted and the official results appeared in a report entitled “Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia.” The report favored the continued use of the substance. Overall, the report concluded that the risks to the environment, humans, mammals, most insects, and birds were low. In addition to the findings of Seralini’s study, however, the report found that mixing glyphosate with additives such as Cosmo-Flux produced higher levels of toxicity and had some potential to adversely affect certain

¹¹² The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR 2005 Volume I), 20.

¹¹³ For more information, go to Thomas D. Williams, “US Role in Massive Aerial Herbicide Spraying Revealed,” *The Public Record*, July 19, 2009, <http://pubrecord.org/world/2547/aerial-herbicide-spraying-colombia/>.

species such as amphibians found in shallow bodies of water near spray sites.¹¹⁴ In opposition to Seralini's study, the CICAD study found no connection between complications with pregnancy and the glyphosate used in aerial eradication. To be fair, it is also important to consider that the total amount glyphosate used in the context of drug eradication accounts for less than 15% of the total glyphosate used in Colombia. The remaining 85% is used in other non-eradication agricultural uses, which further confirm the safety of the substance according to the study.

Regardless of which reports are the most accurate regarding toxicity levels and its effects, the physical damage imposed to the landscape that results from both manual and aerial eradication is undeniable. The direct effects of the chemical compounds used in aerial spraying may well be negligible as demonstrated in the Figure 3. However, what is often overlooked is, that regardless of the means employed (aerial or manual), coca eradication results in deforestation. When coca crops are destroyed in one area, *cocaleros* move their operation to a new area and start over: a process that involves clear cutting and burning, planting, and the use of various pesticides to facilitate coca growing.

¹¹⁴ A report prepared by a scientific advisory team of scientists and medical doctors for the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) section of the Organization of American States (OAS) entitled *Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia* (Washington, DC, March 31, 2005). For more information, go to Keith R. Solomon et al., "Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia," *Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) Section of the Organization of American States (OAS)*, March 31, 2005, 87–93, <http://www.scm.oas.org/pdfs/2007/CP17420E.pdf>.

Impacts	Intensity Score	Recovery Time (Y)	Impact Score	% Impact
Clear cutting and burning	5	60	300	97.6
Planting the coca or poppy	1	4	4	1.3
Fertilizer inputs	1	0.5	0.5	0.2
Pesticide Inputs	2	0.5	1	0.3
Eradication spray	1	0.5	0.5	0.2
Processing and refining	2	1	2	0.7

Figure 3. Dr. Solomon et al., Potential Environmental Impacts of the Cycle of Coca or Poppy Production and the Spray Eradication Program¹¹⁵

Also of considerable significance is the fact that the substances used by the *cocaleros* to produce the coca paste (the first step of the process that starts with the coca leaves, then moves to coca paste, and then to cocaine base, and finally to cocaine itself) are far more hazardous to humans and the environment than glyphosate. The dangers of these refining agents are exacerbated, as the *cocaleros* who use them normally do not use any kind of protection, and are mostly uninformed about the consequences from exposure, or the hazards that the substances pose to the environment. Largely uneducated about the proper quantity of fertilizers, and about the dangers associated with these chemicals, they routinely dump large quantities of these highly toxic substances without regard of the effects. These chemicals include paraquat and endosulfan, both of which qualify under the EPA's highest classification for toxicity (Category I) and are legally restricted for sale within Colombia and the United States.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile U.S. government

¹¹⁵ The table represents data from Figure 28 from the report prepared by Dr. Keith Solomon et al, *Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia*, 90. Of note from the report is the fact that, in the context of the environmental risks from the activities associated with the production of coca and poppy, the effects of the glyphosate spray itself are small. The major effects are attributed primarily to the uncontrolled and unplanned clearing of pristine lands in ecologically important areas for the purposes of planting the crop, and to a lesser extent, the chemicals used both as fertilizer for coca, and in the processing of coca paste.

¹¹⁶ The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR 2005 Volume I), 19.

studies conducted in the early 1990s in Bolivia and Peru indicated that producing one kilogram of cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. These toxic pesticides, fertilizers, and processing chemicals are then dumped into the nearest waterway or on the ground. They saturate the soil and contaminate waterways, poison water systems, and affect dependent species in the process.¹¹⁷

The costs of the environmental impact relating to the use of approved herbicides, such as glyphosate, must be measured against the potential environmental distress resulting from all phases of coca cultivation and refining. For example, in the past two decades, coca cultivation in the Andean region has led to the devastation of approximately six million acres of rainforest. Continuously displaced by government eradication efforts and competition between drug traffickers, the *cocaleros* move to ever more remote areas and routinely engage in the “slash and burn” of forested land to make way for their new illegal crops.¹¹⁸ To compound the problem, the devastated land is unstable, and regular occurring tropical rains quickly erode the thin layer of topsoil from the fields. The practice perpetuates a cycle of soil runoff, depleting soil of nutrients, destroying timber and other natural resources that would otherwise be available for more sustainable uses, and decreased biological diversity.

It is not just the *cocaleros* who contribute to the physical destruction of the forest. The drug traffickers also destroy countless acres of jungle forests to construct landing strips for their aircrafts and coca processing laboratories. Flaviano Avila, a farmer in Guaviare, Colombia, expressed perhaps the most persuasive argument made about the environmental harm related to coca eradication. “Until there is investment to change the foundation of our economy, people will continue to plant and replant coca, cutting down

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

forests and doing what it takes to grow the only product that is easy to bring to market, always has a buyer, and generates an income to provide for a family.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Witness for Peace, Fundacion Minga and Institute for Policy Studies, “An Exercise in Futility: Nine Years of Fumigation in Colombia,” 5.

V. CONCLUSION

From its inception, Plan Colombia has been controversial and continues even today to stimulate significant debate from academics, political figures, and non-governmental organizations in the region, from within the United States, and around the world. Plan Colombia underwent a transformation from a Colombian vision to a U.S. vision that subordinated development strategies in favor of militarization. Lacking the array of results promised, and faced with a litany of unintended consequences, controversy has accompanied Plan Colombia throughout the duration of its five-year execution. The principle argument made repeatedly by critics is that any plan that discounts Colombia's underlying socioeconomic reality, and instead, emphasizes on a militarized solution will inevitably fail, regardless of the billion-dollar budget.

Primary to globalization were the most important global economic transformations of the past 40 years; namely, economic deregulation and technological advancements. As seen, globalization has reinforced uneven economic development and "the hollowing out of the state," and has in part helped to set the conditions for deviant entrepreneurs to exploit the socioeconomic realities present in Colombia and the Andean region. U.S. efforts to eradicate coca have neglected the significance of globalization (deviant or otherwise). Globalization, and the continuously evolving infrastructure that keeps it moving, has enabled deviant entrepreneurs to exploit "hollowed out" states and alter in a meaningful way, existing political structures. In the developing world especially, deviant entrepreneurs have accrued the power and influence comparable to the state.

Taken from the perspective of the deviant entrepreneur (*cocaleros* included), nothing is deviant about deviant globalization. Due to factors, such as institutional weakness, limited state capacity, and substandard educational opportunities, large portions of the developing world are in effect ineligible from fully participating in the formal global economy. As such, deviant entrepreneurs have replaced the state, and in some cases, serve as the sole mediators for prosperity and development.

Underwriting the power and influence of these deviant entrepreneurs is the profit from illicit narcotics, and the greatest contributor to the value of illicit narcotics, such as cocaine, is the huge risk associated with producing and bringing the commodity to market. Actively enforced prohibition keeps prices of cocaine high, and ultimately, is responsible for the windfall profits earned by transnational organized crime, the basis for its power and influence. As some coca is eradicated and some traffickers are caught, the medium to long-term result of is indirect price support to the industry overall, and movement of the industry into others regions, thereby expanding the problem. Such was the case for Colombia that in 1999 prior to Plan Colombia and aerial eradication program had 12 coca producing departments. By the end, the number of coca producing provinces had skyrocketed to thirty-seven. As the research suggests, efforts to eradicate and interdict coca force risk-averse growers and traffickers to move their operations to areas in which the risks are fewer and profits are higher.

Despite the large interdiction and eradication campaigns associated with Plan Colombia, the United States has failed to achieve the anticipated reduction in the supply of cocaine. As demand for the drug remained relatively constant, the window was left open for the “balloon effect,” and the still profitable activities migrated to other regions within Colombia, and other countries in the region. The unintended consequences and human rights toll paid by the populace have been extraordinarily high, and they continue to be a major concern as Colombia continues to have one of the world’s largest populations of internally displaced persons. Only time will tell if the security benefits realized over the past 10 years will prove sustainable in the long run. It must be said that the evidence today suggests that newly constituted forces are slowly emerging whereby legitimate state actors are increasing their reach into previously ungoverned spaces. The dirty war infrastructure of the paramilitaries is being dismantled with the blessing of its top leadership because, as they see it, today “there is a government and there are institutions capable of assuming their responsibilities” and in so doing, is putting an end to 40 years of internal conflict.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Witness for Peace, Fundacion Minga and Institute for Policy Studies, “An Exercise in Futility: Nine Years of Fumigation in Colombia,” 115.

The technological revolution that has exploded over the past 20 years has supported global economic expansion. It has also supported the expansion and influence of transnational criminal organizations and the deviant entrepreneurs who lead them. Twenty or so years ago at the early stages of the Internet, the ability to collect intelligence, develop situational awareness, and moving forces, material and financing quickly around the battlefield while maintaining command and control was a monopoly of the state. The reality today however is much different, whereby individuals and small organizations (because of technological advances) now have similar capabilities and capacity of states. The organization of these groups, unlike those of the state, is highly decentralized, and might be best thought of as a highly adaptable network of networks. For example, each segment of the value chain in the cocaine trade is independent of the other. Where it may take months or even years for the international prohibition regime to agree on a plan, and implement a coca eradication campaign, those on the receiving end of it can and do, react almost instantaneously.

Bilateral agreements are insufficient to address this global problem. Future endeavors to reduce cocaine production and trafficking must focus on international cooperation that also consider demand reduction initiatives in the largest cocaine consumer markets (the United States and Europe) and place more emphasis on strengthening institutions and alternative development initiatives in the focus country. Primary consideration also needs to be given to the objectives of the requesting country to achieve a better balance between long-term development goals and short-term security goals. For Plan Colombia, the U.S. singular focus on security over social development, and the subsequent ‘militarized’ approach, was a significant departure from the intent of the Pastrana administration. Perhaps because the United States was the only significant donor of aid, the focus shifted both in strategy and implementation predominantly towards a U.S. vision of Plan Colombia, and as a result, neither country fully realized their goals. By avoiding U.S. unilateralism in future endeavors, and considering global perspectives and strategies, then the unintended consequences as experienced in Colombia can be more readily curtailed. For example, consider the 2007 Mexican initiative targeting the recent wave of drug-related crime and violence. The “Mérida

Initiative” as it became known, was quickly compared with Plan Colombia, and critics were quick to point out flaws in Plan Colombia, such as undermining of national sovereignty; insufficient attention to socioeconomic development; failure to reduce drug production and trafficking; and inadequate attention to human rights violations especially by government forces. Proponents on the other hand, were quick to emphasize a major difference between the two plans, especially the fact that no US military personnel would be stationed on Mexico. At least at the level of discourse, it seems that “some policy learning has occurred since 2000, and US perceptions of its own responsibilities have evolved.”¹²¹ On the ground however, the Mérida Initiative appears to have taken an equally militarized approach, and may be in danger of repeating some of the mistakes made during Plan Colombia.

Finally, although the focus of future research, an honest legalization debate paired with a large-scale demand reduction campaign should also be considered as a means of reducing the violence and negative externalities that result from the drug war. The main obstacle to starting this sort of candid discussion, however, is countering the 40-plus years of consistent support for a policy that briefs well to the American public. To answer the question of, how to make politicians admit in public that the war on drugs has been a complete failure, Sanho Tree offers a solution.

The topic of decriminalization or legalization has traditionally been a *third rail* in American politics, in that it may mean political suicide to have a meaningful and candid discussion on the topic. Instead, drug policy opinions are shared behind closed doors in secret during off-line discussions. As a result, no representative or candidate wants to be the first mover on this topic. “Those who have worked on this issue know one of the most cynical secrets in Washington: many elected officials (if not an outright majority) are willing to acknowledge the fundamental failure of the drug war in private, but continue to

¹²¹ Bailey, John. “Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative: Policy Twins or Distant Cousins?” in Isidro Morales, ed., *National Solutions to Trans-Border Problems?: The Governance of Security and Risk in a post-NAFTA North America* (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 149-160.

vote in favor of it when the yeas and nays are called.”¹²² One way to bypass this aversion to open dialogue about drug policy as recommended by Sanho Tree, may be to conduct a blind Congressional straw poll with nonbinding results. Straw polls are particularly useful in that, even though the outcomes are non-binding, they do encourage open discussion about sensitive topics because true opinions are often revealed. Straw polls are conducted regularly on a wide variety of topics to determine if enough support for an idea exists. Making it a blind straw poll and using secret ballots during the vote will maintain anonymity. This process will likely reveal actual opinions regarding the current drug policy, and can help to determine if alternative policies, such as decriminalization or legalization for example, is enough of a mainstream idea to act on it.

¹²² Comments from Sanho Tree on June 26, 2010 at a political rally held in Seattle WA. View at Sanho Tree, “Third Rail Politics at the 2011 Hempfest,” *IPS*, September 7, 2011, http://www.ips-dc.org/media/third_rail_politics_at_the_2011_seattle_hempfest.

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